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Abstract: During the 1990s the Greek economy has flourished, with the help of the 
banking  system,  which,  at  the  same  period,  has  undergone  considerable 
deregulation. The stock market “explosion” at the end of the decade has provided 
the necessary funds for the expansion of many Greek Banks in various countries and 
particularly those of the Balkan area. Some Greek companies had already expanded 
their business activities in these countries, which at the time were in the process of 
transition to the market economy, thus giving to the Greek Banks the incentive to 
follow their clientele. The expansion of Greek banks in the Balkans was such that 
they obtained significant market shares in some of the area’s countries. 
In the current paper we make an effort to examine the feasibility of the expansion of 
Greek banks in these countries, focusing especially on their financial efficiency. To 
that end the Balance Sheets of the parent banks, as well as those of their Balkan 
subsidiaries and associate companies where they held an equity share were studied 
and analyzed. 
Our  main  conclusion  is  that  the  activities  of  the  Geek  banks  in  the  area  were 
successful and had positive effects to their profitability and they reinforced their 
overall financial state. 
Keywords:  Banking  System,  balance  sheets,  financial  analysis,  profitability, 
efficiency, Balkan area. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There are two periods of internalization for the Greek banking system internalization. 
The  first  one  ends  in  1986  with  the  establishment  and  the  development  of  a  network  of 
foreign  owned  banks  in  Greece,  which  obtained  a  relatively  low  market  share,  never 
surpassing 10% of the total market, in both deposits and loans, although they created forty 
(40) branches in the country. In contrast to this “passive” first period, the next one (after 
1986)  is  characterized  as  “active”  because  of  the  internalization  strategy  Greek  banks 
followed, mainly in the Balkan area (Giannitsis, 1999).  This internalization expresses the 
dynamism of Greek banks, in the form of penetration through direct investment, the transfer 
of technology and the export of financial products aiming at the creation and the expansion of 
their market share in the area (Kouniakis S., 1997). The banking sector in Greece obtained 
new  characteristics  and  was  influenced  by  the  international  trends  by  expanding  to  other 
countries (Giannitsis, 1982). Greek banks in the Balkan countries: conclusion derived from the analysis of their balance sheets 
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  Some years ago, the greek banking presence abroad was limited to the servicing of 
Greek  diaspora  in  North  America,  South  Africa,  Germany  and  the  international  financial 
centres  of  London  and  Paris.  As  in  the  more  developed  countries  of  Europe  and  North 
America, the internationalization observed since in Greece  reflected the dynamism of the 
national productive system, as it was expressed by its ability to enter foreign markets through 
direct  investments.  Greek  banks,  following  the  expansion  of  the  Greek  industry,  have 
established subsidiaries in Romania, Moldavia, Albania, Georgia etc, obtained equity shares 
in existing local banks (Bulgaria) or established branches and agency offices (as in Bulgaria, 
Romania and Albania). The Balkans are considered a single economic area (Psiroukis, 1993) 
and the expansion of the Greek banks in it aimed at the improvement of their profitability, 
taking into account the maturity of the Greek market, especially in retail banking (Lidorikis 
A., 2005). There was a substantial number of Greek businesses that created logistics centers, 
production facilities, subsidiaries etc in the Balkans. These businesses had important reasons 
to expand into foreign markets, like the saturation of the domestic market, the intensification 
of competition, the low production cost, the abundance of cheap raw materials, the market 
size etc. Banks were forced to follow their clientele (Chatzidimitriou G., 1997), aware of the 
credit risk in Greece (Mantzounis D., 2005.)  
Examples: 
In Bulgaria settled some of the largest food manufacturing industries such as Delta, 
Chipita, Lulis Mills, textile companies and tourism companies such as the Daskalantonakis 
Group, the Nikas Group, Goody's, the Greek Bottling Company (Coca Cola), Intracom, the 
Varytinis Company, Michaelides Tobbacco, Mailis, etc. In Albania Intracom and Michailidis 
Tobacco. In Romania Lulis Mills, Katselis, Delta, ELGEKA, "Gregory Meals", Everest, the 
Greek  Bottling  Company  (Coca  Cola),  Intracom,  the  Varytinis  Company,  Mailis,  etc.  In 
FYROM Elbisco with the acquisition of Zito Luks, the Delta Group, the Nikas Group, the 
Greek Bottling Company (Coca Cola), Michailidis Tobacco, etc. 
The  presence  and  activities  in  the  Balkans  was  appropriate  and  easier  for  various 
reasons including: 
(A) The orientation towards privatization and the reform of rural property ownership 
(land not belonging solely to the state anymore); 
(B) The operation of market mechanisms and the development of private trade, with the 
abolition of state monopolies in foreign trade and the liberalization of imports and exports; 
(C) The financial and banking reforms in cooperation with the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank as well as the presence of the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development and the European Investment Bank; 
(D) The fact that the maturation of the Greek market and the dynamism of the banks 
could not be invested in expansion in countries of western Europe, because of the intense 
competition; 
(E) The existence of growth prospects as the per capita consumption fell short of the 
average European levels, while there was also an increase in the marginal propensity to save; 
(F)  The  modernization  of  the  structure  of  the  banking  system  with  a  central  bank, 
commercial banks and specialized financial institutions as well as the guarantee to foreign 
banks of the same terms of competition (privatization of banks); 
(G)  The  fact  that  Greek  banks  have  more  expertise  and  experience  of  operating  in 
adverse conditions (high inflation, currency instability, etc.); 
(H)  The  improvement  of  macroeconomic  factors  in  the  Balkans:  After  a  period  of 
macroeconomic restructuring they had reached a very satisfactory rate of economic growth 
and had overcome many problems of the past. At the same time there were made substantial Chouliaras VASILIOS, Bogas CHRISTOS 
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investments in the productive capacity and the infrastructure. Bulgaria and Romania joined 
the European Union, while others were in the preparation phase; 
(I) The high credit growth - Due to economic development businesses required more 
loans  for  their  investments  while  the  local  capital  markets  were  not  fully  developed. 
Alongside, because of the improvement in living conditions, households also increased their 
borrowing; 
(J) The large privatization projects that required the inflow of foreign capital and know-
how, resulting in the majority of the used funds to be controlled by foreign banks; 
(K) The specific economic and cultural relations between Greece and these countries 
(Stergiotis, 1996). 
       The  results  of  extroversion  of  the  Greek  banking  system  is  similar  to  that  of  large 
international banks, since 40% of the profits of banks in developed countries come from 
abroad (Commercial Bank, 2006). For instance, over 50% of ABN-AMRO’s total revenues 
come  from  its  international  operations  (Pattakos  G.,  1996). 
The  banking  market  in  these  countries  could  be  further  improved,  since  in  the  mid  '00s 
financing  to  GDP  was  25%  in  the  Balkans,  77%  in  Greece  and  114%  in  the  Eurozone. 
Lending to individuals as a percentage of GDP was 12% in the Balkans, 33% in Greece and 
55% in the Eurozone. Furthermore, the percentage of lending to households and enterprises as 
a percentage of GDP was 14.5% for Albania and 44% for Bulgaria, respectively, while for 
Greece it was 76% and 104% for the eurozone (Mantzounis D., 2005). 
However, there were a number of challenges, including: 
(I). The large deficits, inflation and lack of confidence because of bank failures in the past. 
(II). Although there was a high yearly growth rate of around 4-5%, these countries competed 
with  China  in  attracting  foreign  investment  by  increasing  labor  costs  as  well  as  labor 
productivity. 
(III). Private consumption favored the expansion of credit to households, however, it brought 
along the risk of the increase of bad debts, which were then at satisfactory levels. Also, the 
percentage of loans in foreign currency, mostly for housing loans, was large and therefore 
posed monetary risks. 
(IV).  Competition  was  intensified,  as  the  2/3  of  the  banks’  assets  in  the  Balkans  were 
controlled  by  foreign  banks.  In  addition  to  Greek  banks  the  following  banks  have  a  
significant presence in the area: Austrian Erste Bank, which after the acquisition of BCR has a 
14% market share in Romania, the also Austrian Raiffeisen Zentral Bank which  holds the 
first place in Albania and Serbia and the third in Romania, the French Societe General which 
is  second  in  Romania,  the  Italian  Unicredito  which  holds  the  first  place  in  Bulgaria,  the 
Hungarian  OPT  Bank  which  is  the  second  largest  bank    in  Bulgaria,  and  others. 
(V). In the past acquisitions were made at a valuation of about 1-1.5 times of the book value. 
Later,  however,  valuations  have  increased,  reaching  about  four  times  the  book  value 
(Commercial Bank, 2010), making these investments too expensive for Greek banks which 
turned to organic growth instead. 
 
It should be also noted that for the period examined (2007-2009) Greek banks faced 
severe challenges that threatened not only their profitability but their whole existence. In mid 
2007  the  situation  of  the  wholesale  credit  markets  appeared  to  have  deteriorated  sharply, 
causing liquidity problems in the banking sector, leading Greek banks to be unwilling to give 
out  new  loans  and  to  be  extremely  selective  about  the  businesses  they  financed.  The 
intensification of the upset in the international financial markets also proved a serious factor Greek banks in the Balkan countries: conclusion derived from the analysis of their balance sheets 
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that influenced the Greek banking system, being far from helpful to remedy the situation. In 
fact the economy was quickly slipping into a recession. 
To stabilize the banking sector, the government decided in October 2008 to subsidize 
Greek banks with public funds by offering both new capital to the banks as well as state 
guaranteed  loans  to  businesses  that  met  some  criteria.  However,  it  was  observed  that  a 
considerable part of the assets of the banks was devaluating fast while, at the same time, the 
slowdown in the credit expansion was affecting their profitability negatively.  
It was decided that the Greek banks would be subsidized with 28 billion Euros, in order 
for the market liquidity to be restored. However, only a small portion of these funds was 
actually  used  finding  its  way  to  the  banks.  The  Greek  finance  minister  at  the  time,  Mr. 
Papathanasiou, admitted his disappointment concerning the rate of absorption of the subsidy 
funds offered. According to the Bank of Greece, only about 4 billion of public funds were 
exchanged with preferred equity to strengthen the capital of banks. Even worse, six months 
after the announcement of the subsidy plan no money was actually given to the banks yet.  
All of the above resulted in a sharp decrease in the lending by banks. According to the 
Bank of Greece, by June 2009 business loans were down by 62,7%, home loans by 52,5% and 
consumer loans by 68%. To make things worse, the government decided that it was prohibited 
for the banks that had received any kind of subsidy to pay out dividends in cash, meaning that 
the greatly decreased profits could only be turned into new shares that would be distributed to 
the existing equity holders. They, in turn, would have to sell their shares through the stock-
market in order to obtain liquidity.  
It is obvious that a liquidity crisis turned into a profitability matter, driving deposit 
interest  rates  very  high,  as  lending,  the  main  source  of  profit  for  banks,  was  decreasing 
dramatically.              
   
2. SUBSIDIARIES OF THE GREEK BANKING GROUPS 
 
Since the late '90s Greek banks through the acquisition of local banks or by organic 
growth managed to develop a remarkable network of subsidiary banks in the Balkans. The 
study of the balance sheets of the banking groups, of the parent banks and of their subsidiaries 
operating in the Balkans provides interesting findings. For the scope of this paper only the 
years 2007-2009 were taken into account, in order for the conclusions not to be affected by 
the economic crisis. Also, it should be noted that Greek banking groups in addition to their 
domestic  and  foreign  bank  subsidiaries  also  have  a  large  number  of  other  businesses 
belonging to the financial sector in Greece and abroad, such as Leasing companies, Mutual 
Fund companies, Property Management Enterprises, etc. 
It should also be taken into account that in the present study we have considered the 
Greek Banking Groups  which have a significant presence in the  Balkans, however, these 
Groups  are  also  present  in  other  third  countries  as  well  as  in  several  Western  European 
countries  (UK,  France,  Germany,  etc.)  and  the  East  (Poland,  Ukraine  etc.).  The  Groups 
examined are: the Group of National Bank of Greece, the Emporiki Bank of Greece Group, 
the Piraeus Bank Group, the Eurobank and Alphabank Groups. 
The percentage of the total assets of all the Groups in the entire Balkan area in relation 
to the total assets of the Groups in 31.12.2009 amounted to about 10%, while the parent banks 
of the Groups had the remaining 90%. However, the percentage of the main banking activity, 
lending, in Balkan countries, is only about 80% of that of the parent banks, thus indicating a 
higher rate of investments in other forms (such as in shares, government and private bonds, 
etc.) than in Greece. The reason is that Balkan countries have adopted the market economy Chouliaras VASILIOS, Bogas CHRISTOS 
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system only in the last two decades and their economies were in transition for a substantial 
period of time.  
The percentage of before tax profits of the Balkan subsidiaries in comparison to those of 
the Groups’ ones is much higher and it even increases from one year to the next. Specifically, 
in 2007 it was 13%, reaching 19% in 2008 and 23% in 2009, while the parent networks are 
less profitable proportionately and gradually decrease their share in the same period (from 
64% in 2007 to 32 % in 2010). The differentiation in effectiveness and its causes will be 
considered in the next paragraph. 
 
If data is broken down by banking group: 
The National Bank of Greece, the oldest and largest in the country with presence in over 
10  countries,  owns  the  United  Bulgarian  Bank  in  Bulgaria,  the  Banca  Romaneasca  in 
Romania, Finansbank A.S.in Turkey, the Vojvodjanska Banka A.D. Novisad in Serbia and the 
Stopanska Banca A.D.- Skopjie in FYROM (the latter two were not included in the present 
study because of inadequate data).  The assets of all those subsidiaries account for 17% of the 
group’s total assets, while the parent bank's percentage is the remaining 73%. It should be 
noted that the Turkish subsidiary Finansbank holds about 12% of the assets of the Group by 
itself. The importance of this fact for the Group can be seen from the profitability (before tax) 
of this particular subsidiary, which accounted for 23% of total profitability and 70% of parent 
profitability  in  2007.  Because  of  the  different  taxation,  in  2009  the  profits  (after  tax)  of 
Finansbank exceeded those of its parent National Bank of Greece. 
        EFG Eurobank is the second largest Greek bank and it owns the Eurobank Tefken Bank 
in Turkey, the Eurobank Bulgaria in Bulgaria and Bankpost in Romania. The total assets of 
all its subsidiaries amount to close to 6% of the Group’s assets, having shown a decreasing 
trend  over  the  last  three  years.  Proportionately  EFG  Eurobank’s  strongest  presence  is  in 
Bulgaria.  Pre-tax  profits,  despite  their  decline,  reinforce  considerably  the  Group’s 
profitability, since the last three years the profitability of the parent bank has been decreasing 
sharply, dropping to zero in 2009. Only the Romanian subsidiary Postbank seems to maintain 
a reasonable level of profitability. 
Alphabank, third largest Greek bank and second in size in the private sector, owns  
Alphabank Romania in Romania with an impressive network of 167 stores, Alphabank A.D. 
Skopjie in FYROM, and Alphabank A.D. Srbijia in Serbia. The assets of the Group’s Balkan 
subsidiaries amount for only 8% of the Group’s total assets, a percentage that has increased 
considerably  during  the  last  three  years.  The  Romania  Alphabank  is  the  most  important 
subsidiary accounting for 7% of the Group’s assets and 65% of all subsidiaries. However, it is 
important to note that throughout the Balkan network of the Group, loans do not appear to be 
supported by deposits, which severely limits the possibility of high growth of the bank in the 
area. 
Emporiki  Bank  of  Greece  owns  Albania  Emporiki  Bank  S.A.  in  Albania,  Bulgaria 
Emporiki Bank S.A. in Bulgaria and Romania Emporiki Bank S.A. in Romania. Despite the 
fact that the development of its Balkan network has been relatively small, with its assets 
amounting only for 2% of the Group’s assets, its profitability (due solely to the Romanian 
subsidiary) improves overall profitability, since the parent Bank has been operating at a loss, 
with losses increasing from one year to the next. These subsidiaries profits become even more 
valuable considering that, as in the case of Alphabank, the loans given out are not financed by 
deposits, meaning that the necessary funds are obtained by other, more expensive, sources 
like the inter-bank market.  Greek banks in the Balkan countries: conclusion derived from the analysis of their balance sheets 
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Finally, Piraeus Bank owns the Bulgaria Piraeus Bank in Bulgaria, the Romania Piraeus 
Bank in Romania, the Tirana Bank in Albania and the Serbia Beograd Piraeus Bank in Serbia. 
The assets of these subsidiaries amount to 10% of the total Group’s assets, while the same 
percentages  hold  for  the deposits  and  the  loans. However,  the  profitability  of  the  Balkan 
subsidiaries of the Group account for about 16% of its total profitability, with the Romanian 
and the Bulgarian subsidiaries making the major contributions. 
3. THE EFFICIENCY OF BANK SUBSIDIARIES 
Regarding the determining factors of banks’ efficiency, there are several approaches 
that are sometimes contradictory. 
 According  to  the  theory  of  “structure  conduct  performance  hypothesis”  there  is  a 
positive relation between profitability and concentration. R. Weiss (1974) claimed that market 
concentration  can  create  collusion  with  competitors  and  thus  monopoly  profits.  Smilrock 
(1985) however, in a study which included the data of 2’700 banks of the State of Kansas, has 
shown that it is not concentration that increases profitability, but the market share obtained. 
In contrast, Berger and Hannan, (1994) according to the efficient market hypothesis, 
argue that companies with more efficient scales of economy, along with good management 
and  technology,  have  lower  cost  per  unit  and  thus  higher  unit  profit.  On  the  other, 
Ghandoldberg and Rai, (1996), having studied data on 11 European countries, did not find a 
strong correlation between profits and market concentration. 
Kapopoulos-  Siokis  (2002),  using  data  for  the  period  1996-1999  for  all  Euro-zone 
countries  and  making  an  econometric  approach,  concluded  that  the  improvement  of 
operational efficiency and capital adequacy has a positive impact on bank profitability, while 
the real interest rate has a negative effect. 
Bourke (1989), based on the reported results of 90 out of the 500 largest banks in the 
developed  countries  of    Europe  and  America  for  the  years  1972-1981  and  applying  the 
method of regression, found a positive relation between profitability and capital adequacy, 
liquidity,  interest  rates  and  market  concentration.  In  the  same  study  he  found  a  negative 
correlation of profits with personelle expenses to a lesser degree. Similar results regarding the 
relation between capital and profitability were shown in a study by Berger (1995), which 
examined the American market for the years 1983 -1989. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huisinga (1989), also applying the method of regression, found out 
that  earnings  are  positively  correlated  with  capital  adequacy  and  the  degree  of  inflation, 
indirect taxes, concentration as well as the level of per capita income. The same economists in 
another  study  (1998),  while  investigating  the  effect  of  the  development  factor  in  bank 
profitability, claimed that in countries where the financial system is less developed the banks' 
profit margins are higher. 
Regarding  interest  rates  Staikouras  and  Steliaros  (1999)  concluded  that  there  is  a 
positive relation between interest rates and bank profitability,  as predicted by Samuelson. 
When interest rates fall profits increase and vice versa, due to the fact that deposit rates can be 
increased  but  funding  rates  are  often  fixed,  thus  decreasing  the  gap  between  them.  The 
difference between short and long term interest rates increases at the end of a recession period 
and diminishes at the end of a development one. In countries with low inflation long term 
interest rates are constant (Hardouvelis, 1994). 
Flannery, in two of his studies in 1981 and 1983 respectively, processed data for 15 
large U.S. banks and found that long-term bank profits are not affected by changes in interest Chouliaras VASILIOS, Bogas CHRISTOS 
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rates, since this rise affects equally the financial income and the expenses of banks, ultimately 
balancing profits. In contrast, in the short run the rising of interest rates reduces profits. 
Perry (1992) correlating profitability and inflation argues that if inflation is rising and 
banks change interest rates in time, it is likely for them to increase their profitability, while, if 
they delay, expenses will rise faster than revenues with a negative effect on profitability. Also, 
most researchers associate the low profitability of the banking system with regulation, mainly 
because of the mandatory deposits it requires, as well as the compulsory structure of the 
banks’ portfolios. 
In a study on the Greek banking system and the deregulation of the decade 1993-2002 
(Chouliaras, 2009), it was found that there is a strong correlation between bank profitability 
and stock market boom and the spread and the loan–deposit ratio. 
As far as the issue of banking efficiency in economies in transition is concerned there 
are  different  points  of  view,  focusing  on  different.  One  popular  approach  has  been  the 
comparison of the efficiency of foreign owned banks to those of domestic ownership. In this 
aspect Berger (Berger et al, 2000) concludes that foreign owned financial institutions are less 
effective than domestic ones, a finding on which Miller and Parkhe (Milles S., Parkhe A, 
2002) agree after conducting a broad study considering profit efficiency in fourteen different 
nations. On the other hand Bonin, (Bonin J.P. et al, 2004) argues that foreign owned banks are 
more  cost  –  efficient  than  domestic  ones  and  that  they  provide  better  service.  The  same 
conclusion is partially reached by Glaveli (Glaveli N. et al, 2006) considering the point of the 
bank service quality, in a study with evidence from five Balkan countries.  
It is widely accepted that economies in transition undergo considerable deregulation, 
providing  new  opportunities  to  international  financial  enterprises  and  banks  in  particular. 
From this point of view the Greek banking system was the first to undergo such deregulation 
leading to extensive mergers and acquisitions which benefited the larger banks (Mantzaris J., 
2008) and in turn led to their expansion in the Balkans. This was the natural thing to do 
according to Morck and Yeung (Morck R.,Yeung B., 1991) who claim that operating abroad 
gives banks the opportunity to follow their customers. They also argue that multinational 
banks have the advantage of transferring intangible assets such as technology and reputation 
from the home country to the subsidiaries. This is consistent with Williams’ (Williams B., 
2002) “defensive expansion theory” which claims that such transfer is also possible; between 
subsidiaries. Hence, banks that operate abroad might be able to transfer resources such as 
technology or employees with increased skills and experience in terms of risk management, 
regulatory and reporting practices, gained from working in more sophisticated and advanced 
environments. Finally, Grigorian and Manole (Grigorian D.A., Manole V., 2002) conclude 
that  the  banking  sectors  in  transition  economies  have  experienced  major  transformations 
throughout the 1990s. While some countries have been successful in eliminating underlying 
distortions and restructuring their financial sectors, in some cases financial sectors remain 
underdeveloped and the rates of financial intermediation continue to be low. This was the case 
in the Balkan area, thus giving Greek banks the opportunity to cover that gap. 
In  their  study  of  12  Greek  banks  operating  abroad  during  the  period  1998  –  2001 
Kosmidou  and  other  researchers  (Kosmidou  et  al,  2005)  found  that  the  profits  of  the 
subsidiaries operating abroad are related to the profits of the parent bank, the trade relations 
between Greece and the host country, the difference of the GDP growth between the two 
countries,  the  years  operating  in  the  host  market  and  the  time  trend.  The  size  of  the 
subsidiaries was found to be related to the size of the parent bank, the trade the GDP growth, 
the years of operation and the time trend.  Greek banks in the Balkan countries: conclusion derived from the analysis of their balance sheets 
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To  examine  the  efficiency  of  the  Balkan  subsidiaries  of  Greek  banks  key  ratio 
indicators, such as Return on Assets and Return on Equity were used. Based on the first one 
we concluded that efficiency (though gradually declining from 21% in 2007 to 12% in 2009) 
is considerably greater in the subsidiaries than in the parent banks (their ROA declined from 
12% in 2007 to 2% 2009). The reasons for this change are attributed to two factors. The first 
factor  is  the  greater  leverage  caused  by  the  relation  between  loans  and  deposits.  For  the 
Balkan subsidiaries this relation varies from 1.13 to 1.19, while for the parent banks from 
1.06 to 1.1. The second reason has to do with the differentiation in the level of interest rates. 
The ratio for interest income to total returns for the Balkan subsidiaries in the three years 
ranged from 8.8% to 10.1%, while in the parent companies it ranged from 4.6% to 6.1%.  A 
third reason could be found in the spread between loans and deposits, but the relevant data 
was not available to examine. However, we conclude that the higher the level of interest rates, 
the greater the spread must be. Besides the ratio “financial results” (i.e. the difference between 
credit and debit interest) is almost double for the Balkan subsidiaries (ranging from 4.4% to 
5.2%)  compared  to  that  of  the  parent  banks  (ranging  from  1.8%  to  2.2%).  Finally,  a 
hypothesis without supporting evidence is the opinion of efficiency differentiation because of 
lower level in wages and salaries in those countries. 
A  minor  difference  is  observed  in  the  ROE  ratio  which  for  all  Balkan  subsidiaries 
ranges from 11% to 19%, while for the parent banks is from 3% to 18%. 
 
Findings by Bank Group: 
 
- National Bank of Greece: 
 
Efficiency is similar to what has been described above for all banks. The subsidiaries ROA is 
double (from 1.7% to 2.8%) of that of the parent bank (from 0.4% to 1.5%). Respectively the 
subsidiaries ROE ratio  much in the same way  ranges  from 17.5% to 24.8% (percentages 
judged as too high, even without a benchmark) while the parent bank’s ratio ranges from 
4.9% to 15.8%. The causes of greater efficiency are also similar to those for all banks: a 
higher level of interest  rates  (0.154 to 0.188 versus 0.063 to 0.86), an  increased loan-to-
deposit  ratio  (from  1.004  to  1.215  versus  0.811  to  1.001)  and  possibly  larger  spreads 
(financial result to assets ranging from 0.056 to 0.069 versus 0.024 to 0.025). 
      At this point it should be noted the contribution of the Turkish subsidiary Finansbank with 
its efficiency ranging from 1.9 to 3%, which, because of its size in relation to the total, boosts 
overall efficiency. The reasons lie mainly in interest rate levels (which keep increasing over 
time) and not in leverage, which is similar to that of the parent bank. The United Bulgarian 
Bank also presents a higher efficiency, which however, is due mainly to greater leverage 




Unlike all the banks, Eurobank’s efficiency is not greater in its Balkan subsidiaries compared 
to that of the parent bank. However, it is interesting to see that efficiency declines faster in the 
parent bank than in its subsidiaries. Ceteris paribus, the reasons for this are found in the 
weaker link of the loans to the deposits, which for the subsidiaries ranges from 0.865 to 0.915 
and from 0.917 to 0.980 for the parent bank. Furthermore, the Romanian subsidiary Bankpost 
presents an exception to this trend with its efficiency remaining steady. 
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- Alphabank 
 
Alphabank  is  at  the  other  end  of  the  spectrum  as  far  as  the  enhancing  of  the  Group’s 
profitability  by  its  subsidiaries’  contribution  is  concerned.  Specifically,  the  Balkan 
subsidiaries not only do not contribute to the Group’s efficiency but rather decrease it, mainly 
due to the operation at a loss of Srbija Alphabank and Skopje Alphabank. The performance of 
all subsidiaries ranged from -0.2% to 14% compared to the parent bank’s that ranged from 
0.6%  to  11%  respectively.  This  happens  even  though  the  relation  of  loans  to  deposits  is 
considerably higher in the subsidiaries (1.650 to 2.141 for the subsidiaries and 1.186 to 1.511 
for the parent bank). The situation appears somewhat better for the Romanian Postbank, the 
efficiency of which, although reduced from year to year, does not turn negative. The cause 
may lie in the different leverage of capital, which in this case is greater and therefore the 
subsidiary’s  ROE  appears  better  than  those  of  the  other  Balkan  subsidiaries. 
 
- Emporiki Bank of Greece 
 
The  Emporiki  Group  presents  the  opposite  situation  to  that  of  Alphabank.  While  the 
profitability of the parent bank not only decreased but even became negative (from 0.2% in 
2007 to -2% in 2009), the ROE of all its subsidiaries is positive and gradually increases (from 
0.5% in 2007 reaches 2.1% in 2009). The satisfactory results are due solely to the Romania 
Emporiki Bank S.A. (it is negative for all other subsidiaries) whose ROA increased from 
1.4% in 2007 to 10.1% in 2009. The greater efficiency is the result of the reasons described 
for all banks, meaning the better leveraging (ranging from 1.138 to 2.157 for the Romanian 
subsidiary as opposed to the parent bank’s 1.036 to 1.402), the slightly higher interest rates 
(0.6 versus 0.5) and probably the improved spreads (financial results to total assets ranging 
from  0.027  to  0.038  for  the  subsidiary  versus  0.018  to  0.028  for  the  parent  bank). 
 
- Bank of Piraeus 
 
As  in  the  previous  case,  the  Balkan  subsidiaries  of  the  Group  enhance  its  profitability. 
Specifically, the performance of all subsidiaries is consistently over 1% (from 1.2% to 1.8%) 
whereas the parent bank’s performance has been reducing from 1.2% in 2007 to 0.4% in 
2009.  Excluding  the  Serbian  subsidiary,  all  other  subsidiaries  are  more  efficient  than  the 
parent bank. The Bulgarian subsidiary’s efficiency remained stable, while there was a gradual 
efficiency decrease for the Albanian one. However, the causes of efficiency for all banks and 
by bank do not hold true in the case of this particular group. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The dynamism of the deregulated Greek banking system and of the stock market boom 
at the end of the last decade offered the necessary funds for the expansion of Greek banks in 
several countries, particularly the Balkans. The expansion of Greek banks in the Balkan area 
has been noteworthy as they obtained significant market shares in some countries.  
This  paper  attempts  to  investigate  the  feasibility  of  expansion  of  banks  in  these 
countries, by examining particularly their economic efficiency. To this end we have studied 
and analyzed the balance sheets of both the Greek parent banks as well as those of their 
subsidiaries and calculated the main performance indicators - ratios. The study was limited in 
finding the causes of differences in financial, not operational issues. The main conclusion is Greek banks in the Balkan countries: conclusion derived from the analysis of their balance sheets 
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that, in general, and in most cases, the movements of the Greek banks were successful and 
that they had positive effects on their overall profitability and efficiency. 
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TABLE : BALANCE-SHEETS AND RATIOS 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
              ALL GROUPS           
2007  192268  287003  20082  171540  19179  10852  8328  4768  4002  0,017  0,237  1,12  0,029  0,06 
2008  238502  333659  17638  202603  24405  14833  9571  3369  3597  0,010  0,191  1,17  0,029  0,07 
2009  241801  349849  25342  206475  20306  10615  9689  1855  1346  0,005  0,073  1,17  0,028  0,05 
             
ALL PARENT 
(GREEK)BANKS           
2007  157721  262518  16969  148329  15523  9621  5902  3058  2549  0,012  0,180  1,06  0,022  0,05 
2008  194701  323491  14818  176683  19819  13454  6365  1032  676  0,003  0,070  1,10  0,020  0,06 
2009  194310  335946  21095  179937  15509  9326  6193  602  215  0,002  0,029  1,08  0,018  0,04 
             
ALL BALKAN 
SUBSIDIARIES             
2007  19944  29716  3357  16949  2612  1292  1437  628  553  0,021  0,187  1,17  0,048  0,08 
2008  26054  38875  4019  21957  3860  2164  1697  628  549  0,016  0,156  1,18  0,044  0,09 
2009  23671  36032  3768  20982  3651  1793  1869  427  370  0,012  0,113  1,12  0,052  0,10 
           
NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE  GROUP 
       
2007  54693  90385  6470  60530  5736  2686  3051  1902  1644  0,021  0,294  0,90  0,034  0,10 
2008  69898  101323  5972  67657  6941  3361  3580  1937  1584  0,019  0,324  1,03  0,035  0,09 
2009  74753  113394  8453  71194  6552  2611  3940  1252  963  0,011  0,148  1,05  0,035  0,08 
           
PARENT 
(GREEK) BANK               
2007  39958  71059  6536  49259  3440  1630  1811  1032  915  0,015  0,158  0,81  0,025  0,08 
2008  53440  83820  6434  56291  4066  2018  2048  633  480  0,008  0,098  0,94  0,024  0,07 
2009  58129  91220  8224  58081  3677  1456  2231  403  225  0,004  0,049  1,00  0,024  0,06 
            TOTAL BALKAN 
SUBSIDIARIES 
           
2007  10982  15758  1796  9153  1695  819  876  445  391  0,028  0,248  1,20  0,056  0,15 
2008  13929  19866  2193  11464  2232  1180  1052  389  337  0,020  0,178  1,21  0,053  0,16 
2009  12534  19580  1952  12483  2358  1011  1347  342  303  0,017  0,175  1,00  0,069  0,18 
            UNITED BULGARIAN BANK           
2007  2508  3128  382  1745  195  54  141  105  94  0,034  0,275  1,43  0,045  0,07 Chouliaras VASILIOS, Bogas CHRISTOS 
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2008  3434  3945  479  2045  303  125  178  111  99  0,028  0,231  1,67  0,045  0,08 
2009  3318  4149  522  2165  326  130  195  46  41  0,011  0,088  1,53  0,047  0,09 
            FINANSBANK A.S.             
2007  7349  10965  1283  6847  1408  716  692  328  286  0,030  0,255  1,07  0,063  0,19 
2008  9061  13677  1484  8648  1761  941  820  261  222  0,019  0,176  1,04  0,060  0,19 
2009  7927  13326  1194  9212  1822  759  1063  293  260  0,022  0,246  0,86  0,080  0,23 
            EUROBANK  GROUP             
2007  45638  68389  5359  36151  5980  3976  2004  1050  831  0,015  0,196  1,26  0,029  0,08 
2008  55878  82202  4623  45656  7488  5103  2385  818  677  0,010  0,177  1,22  0,029  0,09 
2009  55837  84269  6314  46808  5987  3646  2341  398  316  0,005  0,063  1,19  0,028  0,07 
           
PARENT 
(GREEK) BANK               
2007  37325  68272  3910  38939  5345  3874  1471  854  705  0,013  0,218  0,95  0,022  0,07 
2008  43570  93065  3190  44467  6827  5291  1536  263  236  0,003  0,082  0,98  0,017  0,07 
2009  42015  99856  3745  45807  5311  3979  1332  0  3  0,000  0,000  0,91  0,013  0,05 
           
TOTAL (BALKAN)  
SUBSIDIARIES             
2007  3058  6731  572  3484  484  261  223  84  75  0,013  0,147  0,87  0,033  0,07 
2008  4474  8030  615  5169  828  533  294  95  82  0,012  0,155  0,86  0,037  0,10 
2009  2750  4762  573  3007  468  304  165  22  18  0,005  0,038  0,91  0,035  0,09 
            EUROBANK TEFKEN             
2007  407  1250  124  524  125  94  31  10  8  0,008  0,081  0,77  0,025  0,10 
2008  505  1582  124  816  208  172  36  7  5  0,005  0,059  0,61  0,023  0,13 
2009  612  1753  201  841  197  150  47  13  10  0,007  0,063  0,72  0,027  0,11 
            EUROBANK BULGARIA             
2007  1375  2208  221  1668  162  62  100  42  39  0,019  0,190  0,82  0,045  0,07 
2008  1858  2714  239  1924  257  130  127  51  45  0,019  0,214  0,96  0,047  0,09 
2009  2138  3010  373  2166  272  154  118  9  8  0,003  0,024  0,98  0,039  0,09 
            BANKPOST               
2007  1277  3273  227  1293  198  106  92  32  29  0,010  0,142  0,98  0,028  0,06 
2008  2110  3734  252  2429  363  231  132  37  31  0,010  0,147  0,86  0,035  0,09 Greek banks in the Balkan countries: conclusion derived from the analysis of their balance sheets 
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            ALPHABANK GROUP             
2007  42072  54594  4291  34665  3406  1801  1605  985  851  0,018  0,23  1,21  0,029  0,06 
2008  50704  65216  3940  42546  4406  2608  1798  625  513  0,01  0,159  1,19  0,028  0,06 
2009  51399  69480  5973  42916  3875  2112  1762  502  391  0,007  0,084  1,19  0,025  0,05 
           
PARENT 
(GREEK) BANK               
2007  35267  54039  2740  23334  3106  1879  1227  613  457  0,011  0,224  1,51  0,023  0,05 
2008  42189  66738  2369  33816  4118  2768  1350  395  334  0,006  0,167  1,24  0,02  0,06 
2009  41810  67848  4775  35258  3339  1995  1344  567  428  0,008  0,119  1,18  0,02  0,04 
           
TOTAL 
(BALKAN)SUBSIDIARIES             
2007  2540  2705  353  1546  201  118  198  37  33  0,014  0,107  1,64  0,074  0,07 
2008  3114  5119  430  1888  349  218  131  43  40,7  0,008  0,1  1,65  0,026  0,06 
2009  3950  5846  404  1845  362  211  162  -9  -14 
-
0,002  -0,02  2,14  0,028  0,06 
            SRBIJA AD               
2007  223  478  93  305  32  14  18  2  2  0,005  0,023  0,73  0,038  0,06 
2008  233  550  139  324  55  25  29  8  8  0,014  0,057  0,71  0,054  0,10 
2009  387  691  117  80  38  25  12  -24  -26 
-
0,035  -0,21  4,85  0,018  0,05 
            ROMANIA ALPHA BANK           
2007  2237  2113  233  1181  162  102  176  34  30  0,016  0,146  1,89  0,083  0,07 
2008  2742  4380  265  1483  283  187  96  37  34  0,008  0,14  1,84  0,022  0,06 
2009  3459  5011  265  1706  311  181  142  18  15  0,004  0,068  2,02  0,028  0,06 
            SKOPJE ALPHA BANK             
2007  79  115  27  60  6  2  4  1  1  0,013  0,055  1,31  0,041  0,05 
2008  139  189  25  80  11  6  5  -1  -1 
-
0,009  -0,07  1,73  0,029  0,06 
2009  105  145  22  59  13  5  8  -3  -3 
-
0,023  -0,15  1,77  0,056  0,08 
           
COMMERCIAL BANK OF GREECE 
       
           
GROUP 
             
2007  19577  27208  880  18127  1395  644  751  46  25  0,002  0,052  1,08  0,028  0,05 
2008  23710  30029  227  18364  1672  1023  649  -396  492  -
0,013 
-1,74  1,29  0,022  0,05 Chouliaras VASILIOS, Bogas CHRISTOS 
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2009  22124  28426  1136  15494  1103  562  542  -583  -530 
-
0,021  -0,51  1,42  0,019  0,03 
           
PARENT 
(GREEK)  
BANK               
2007  18408  26805  839  17767  1311  622  688  61  49  0,002  0,073  1,03  0,026  0,04 
2008  22019  29655  201  17999  1578  996  581  -396  -487 
-
0,013  -1,97  1,22  0,02  0,05 
2009  21111  28100  1113  15061  1032  530  503  -569  -587  -0,02  -0,51  1,40  0,018  0,03 
            TOTAL (BALKAN) SUBSIDIARIES           
2007  317  413  49  190  22  9  13  1  0,9  0,005  0,039  1,66  0,032  0,05 
2008  475  606  84  184  37  18  18  5,  5,2  0,009  0,062  2,58  0,031  0,06 
2009  509  635  71  226  42  21  20  13  13  0,021  0,189  2,25  0,032  0,06 
            ALBANIA EMPORIKI BANK SA           
2007  141  171  19  75  9  4  5  1  1,1  0,008  0,074  1,88  0,033  0,05 
2008  159  182  25  68  12  6  6  -0,6  -0,6 
-
0,004  -0,03  2,34  0,035  0,06 
2009  178  211  28  79  14  7  7  -1,3  -1,5 
-
0,007  -0,05  2,26  0,037  0,07 
            BULGARIA EMPORIKI BANK SA           
2007  102  122  12  50  4  1  3  -1,2  -1,9  -0,01  -0,1  2,04  0,025  0,03 
2008  206  241  20  65  12  6  6  -1,9  -1,9 
-
0,008  -0,1  3,16  0,025  0,05 
2009  219  242  23  69  14  7  7  -3,4  -3,7 
-
0,014  -0,15  3,17  0,032  0,06 
            PIRAEUS BANK             
            GROUP               
2007  30288  46427  3082  22067  2662  1745  917  785  651  0,017  0,255  1,37  0,02  0,05 
2008  38312  54889  2876  28380  3898  2738  1159  385  331  0,007  0,134  1,35  0,021  0,07 
2009  37688  54280  3466  30063  2789  1684  1104  286  206  0,005  0,083  1,25  0,02  0,05 
           
PARENT  
(GREEK) BANK               
2007  26763  42343  2944  19030  2321  1616  705  498  423  0,012  0,169  1,40  0,017  0,05 
2008  33483  50213  2624  24110  3230  2381  850  137  113  0,003  0,052  1,38  0,017  0,06 Greek banks in the Balkan countries: conclusion derived from the analysis of their balance sheets 
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2009  31245  48922  3238  25730  2150  1366  783  201  146  0,004  0,062  1,21  0,016  0,04 
           
TOTAL (BALKAN)  
SUBSIDIARIES           
2007  3047  4109  586  2576  211  85  126  59  52  0,014  0,101  1,18  0,031  0,05 
2008  4061  5253  697  3252  414  214  200  95  84  0,018  0,136  1,24  0,038  0,07 
2009  3927  5208  768  3421  421  246  175  60  50  0,012  0,078  1,14  0,034  0,08 
            ROMANIA PIRAEUS BANK           
2007  1001  1495  240  485  76  28  49  19  14  0,013  0,079  2,06  0,033  0,05 
2008  1572  2306  282  973  212  114  98  49  41  0,021  0,172  1,61  0,043  0,09 
2009  1523  2371  321  1268  228  163  65  26  19  0,011  0,081  1,20  0,027  0,09 
            TIRANA BANK               
2007  292  475  50  359  32  13  19  9  6  0,018  0,174  0,81  0,041  0,06 
2008  385  573  70  372  43  20  23  11  9  0,019  0,158  1,03  0,04  0,07 
2009  404  596  82  398  40  19  21  13  12  0,022  0,162  1,01  0,035  0,06 
            BEOGRADE PIRAEUS BANK           
2007  183  336  88  155  20  10  10  3  5  0,008  0,031  1,17  0,03  0,06 
2008  248  298  107  89  28  11  18  3  2  0,01  0,028  2,78  0,06  0,09 
2009  326  424  102  212  31  9  22  -6  -5 
-
0,013  -0,05  1,54  0,052  0,07 
 
                    COLUMN CONTENT : 
1  Loans  8  Profit before tax     
2  Total assets    9  Profit for the year    
3  Total equity    10  ROA 
4  Deposits  11  ROE 
5  Interest incomes    12  Loans/deposits    
6  Interest expenses                13  Net interest income/total assets                 
7  Net interest income     14  Interest incomes/total assets               
 
 